Proceedings of GREAT Day
Volume 2013

Article 10

2014

Chinese and Indian Military Modernization: An
Asian Arms Race?
Eric Gomez
SUNY Geneseo

Follow this and additional works at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Gomez, Eric (2014) "Chinese and Indian Military Modernization: An Asian Arms Race?," Proceedings of GREAT Day: Vol. 2013 ,
Article 10.
Available at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the GREAT Day at KnightScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Proceedings of
GREAT Day by an authorized editor of KnightScholar. For more information, please contact KnightScholar@geneseo.edu.

Gomez: Chinese and Indian Military Modernization

Chinese and Indian Military Modernization:
An Asian Arms Race?
Eric Gomez

T

tems is occurring at a very steady pace with no state
frantically trying to rush development and outdo the
other. Policymakers are also purposely avoiding using terms like “getting ahead” and other arms race
rhetoric (Till 2013). Another important piece of the
arms race puzzle is threat perception. States do not
engage in arms races against states that they do not
deem to be a credible threat. Even though the present relationship between India and China is not
perfectly balanced or without mistrust, there is no
sense of an immediate threat. If the political and
military elite of both states are able to continue basic
cooperation, then the chance of an arms race breaking out will be significantly reduced.

Introduction

he states of India and China have experienced massive economic growth over the
last three decades, which has produced a
commensurate growth in political power and status
in the international community. One natural consequence of a stronger economy and greater political
power is the development of a modern military to
both protect the homeland and exert more influence
abroad. Both India and China have been engaged
in significant military modernization programs since
their economies “took off,” and over the last decade many new weapons systems have been either
acquired or developed by both states as a result of
their newfound wealth.

This paper is broken into four major sections. First,
the history of Sino-Indian relations since 1949, by
which time both states had adopted the political organizational forms that they have today, is briefly
outlined. This section is further divided into three
subsections: the period before the Sino-Indian War
of 1962, the aftermath and effects of the war on
both India and China, and the long-term consequences and lingering mistrust that affect both states
today. Second, India’s modernization program is examined, with emphasis on the development of their
nuclear triad and their complicated military acquisition process. Third, China’s military modernization
program is examined. Major new weapons systems
such as the Liaoning aircraft carrier, DF-21 ballistic
missile, and Y-20 transport plane, and the impact
these new systems have on Chinese military strategy
and foreign policy are discussed.

As both India and China acquire sophisticated and
modern militaries, there is a concern that the two
states are entering an arms race. An arms race “is
a reciprocal process in which two (or more) states
build up military capabilities in response to each
other” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2012, 57). The
political consequences of an arms race include the
erosion of confidence, the reduction of cooperation, and a heightened risk of warfare. Before the
outbreak of World War I there was a significant naval arms race in Europe, which exacerbated existing
tensions between the states and contributed to the
start of the war (Till 2013). Arms races make the international system fraught with risk and often result
in warfare between powerful states.
The possibility of an arms race existing between
India and China is especially dangerous given their
history of armed conflict and mutual distrust. However, there is cause to hope that the ongoing military
modernization in India and China is not an arms
race, but a “natural” development as a result of the
increasing economic and political power of both
states. Technological development of weapons sysPublished by KnightScholar, 2014

Finally, the paper concludes with an argument for
why India and China are not engaged in an arms
race. While the two states do have an interest in
building up military power, they do not view one another as their primary threats and are not engaged
in an arms race that attempts to radically upset the
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current balance of power. The absence of an arms
race between India and China takes away one major source of potential instability in Asia. Hopefully,
the Sino-Indian relationship will continue to deepen
and improve. A positive relationship between the
two rising Asian powers would go a long way toward
ensuring a peaceful twenty-first century.

This belief was promoted throughout the 1950s
through two major events. First, in 1954 India and
China agreed to the Panchseel Agreement, a joint
declaration that advocated five principles of coexistence: mutual respect for territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Devotta 2010, 100). Panchseel was part of
a larger agreement on Tibet called the Agreement
Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between
the Tibet Region of China and India (Rowland 1967,
85). Nehru was particularly excited about the five
principles, and was outspoken in claiming them to
be a major positive step in Sino-Indian relations.

A Brief History of Sino-Indian
Relations

The history of Sino-Indian relations can be divided
into two distinct periods. The first period, lasting
from 1949–1962, was characterized by a strong desire on the part of the Indian and Chinese political
leadership for cooperation and close relations. The
second period, beginning in 1963 and lasting to the
present, saw a rapid deterioration in relations, closer Chinese cooperation with Pakistan, and a deepseated feeling of mistrust between India and China.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was the primary cause of
the dramatic shift in relations. While there have been
some signs of improvement in relations—especially
economic partnership—, feelings of mistrust and
suspicion still exist at the highest levels of government and military in both states, as well as among
the populace. In order to decrease the likelihood of
armed conflict, both states must work toward addressing the lingering suspicions of one another.

Second, in 1955, Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou
En-Lai attended the Bandung Conference, which
was a major event in the start of the Non-Aligned
Movement during the Cold War that included representatives from many African and Asian countries.
There they were able to get a stamp of approval
for the Panchseel Agreement from other countries
(Sandhu 1988, 98). The Bandung Conference was
seen as a major success in Sino-Indian relations.
It “produced a kind of euphoria that glossed over
the cracks of Sino-Indian difficulties” (Patil 2007,
287). Nehru was very pleased at the progress made
in strengthening Sino-Indian relations. The slogan
“Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” which literally means “Indians and Chinese are brothers,” was used to sum up
the belief among the Indian political elite that China
was a natural partner for cooperation and could be
trusted (Patil 2007, 286).

Sino-Indian Relations Before
1962: Cooperation and Chinese
Encroachment

India’s desire to find common ground and cooperate
with China was outwardly reciprocated. However,
China took military actions near the Indian border
that ran contrary to the idea of Hindi Chini Bhai
Bhai. Two actions in particular signaled China’s intent to seize territory that was claimed by India. In
1950, China invaded and annexed Tibet. With Tibet
under Chinese control, a large geographic and strategic buffer between India and China was removed,
putting India as a geographic neighbor to China
(Wang 2011, 449). Control of Tibet allowed China
place troops on India’s doorstep. Patil asserts that
Nehru had “misjudged Chinese intentions…(and)
did not anticipate Chinese actions on Tibet” (2007,
287). The India/PRC Agreement on Tibet of 1954,

When India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947 and Mao Zedong declared the formation
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October
1949, both countries shared several historical experiences. Both had been controlled by Western colonial
powers, both had mostly rural and agrarian economies, and both had experienced painful internal
strife and political division. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s
first prime minister, was aware of these similarities
and believed that the two countries could work together. He “articulate[d] a vision of two civilizations
co-operating to end balance-of-power politics and
assisting in the emancipation of other regions afflicted by colonialism” (Joshi 2011b, 85).

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/10

100

2

Gomez: Chinese and Indian Military Modernization

mentioned previously, was created to deal with the
Tibet issue. Under the agreement, India recognized
China’s sovereignty over Tibet and China allowed
existing trade and pilgrimage rights to be maintained
(Clark 1968, 44). In terms of security concerns, the
most important part of the 1954 agreement was India’s formal abandonment of its position that Tibet
should remain autonomous (Rowland 1967, 85).
The removal of the Tibetan buffer should have been
seen as a major provocation on the part of the Chinese, but Nehru was reluctant to increase military
readiness.

Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory.
(2011, 452-453)
India refused to bend on the border question and
asserted that the McMahon line was an accurate and
legitimate international boundary. However, the Indian government was unwilling to augment its military capabilities to mount an effective defense of its
claim. Not enough members of the Indian military
and political leadership perceived China’s assertions
regarding Arunachal Pradesh as a serious threat,
which contributed to the Indian military’s poor state
of readiness when war did break out in 1962 (Patil
2007, 288–289).

The second hostile action that China took was the
construction of a network of roads along the Indian
border. These roads would allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces to rapidly deploy and sustain operations against the Indian military. By 1959,
India discovered that one such road went through
the Aksai Chin region, which was claimed by India
as a part of Kashmir (Devotta 2010, 100). The construction of the Aksai Chin road signaled two troubling facts about Sino-India relations, “First that India was not in effective control of some territory…
[second] China was in no mood to oblige its friendly
neighbor”(Patil 2007, 289). B.N. Mullik, then Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), claimed that
despite knowing about the Aksai Chin road, the government did not take any extra precautions to secure
positions in the area (Mullik 1971, 239).

The second cause of aggressive Chinese actions
along the Indian border was the Indian government’s support for the Tibetan government in exile.
In March 1959, a Tibetan uprising against Chinese
occupation resulted in the exile of the Dalai Lama,
the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Tibet’s most important political figure, to India (Wang
2011, 450). One year later, Nehru offered the city
of Dharamsala as a base of operations for the Tibetan government in exile. This put intense strain
on Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese government
viewed India’s sheltering of the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan government in exile to be a “root cause of
the 1962 war” (Malik 2011, 76). Indian support for
the Tibetan government in exile and the question of
the border drawn by the McMahon Line were the
two primary political disputes that led to the 1962
Sino-Indian War.

The reasons for China’s actions close to the Indian
border were rooted in two issues. First, the Chinese
government strongly opposed a border agreement
that was reached when India was under British colonial control, which gave India control of land considered to be part of Tibet. In 1914, the McMahon
line separating British India from Tibet was drawn
and agreed upon by Britain, Tibet, and China (Wang
2011, 448). Along the border of Tibet and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh lies the town of
Tawang. China claimed that the town and the area
around it was once a part of Tibet, but according to
the McMahon line, Tawang was on the Indian side
of the border. However, China’s claim extended beyond just the town. According to Wang:

From 1960–1962, relations between India and China
rapidly deteriorated. After 1959, the Chinese government became more hostile in its relations with
India. Hostile actions taken by the Chinese included:
a propaganda war against India, demands for selfdetermination for Kashmir, and the provision of aid
and asylum to Naga and Mizo insurgents (Patil 2007,
288). There was also a belief among the Chinese political leadership that the governments of the United
States and India were conspiring against Chinese interests. Military force was seen as necessary to foil
the conspiracy (Malik 2011, 77–78).
The Indian government also took actions that put
strain on the relationship. In an April 1960 visit to
India, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered a pro-

The Chinese argue that Tawang is a
Tibetan territory, and because Tibet
is considered part of China, the entire
Published by KnightScholar, 2014
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posal to Nehru in which China would drop its territorial claim to Arunachal Pradesh if India gave up
its claim to the Aksai Chin This swap “would have
given each country legal right to territory already in
its possession” (Garver 2006, 104). Nehru refused
to accept the proposal and insisted that China give
up claims to both Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai
Chin. Instead of accepting Zhou’s offer and cooling
off tension between the two states, Nehru’s choice
to become more confrontational over the border
dispute put undue strain on relations between India
and China. John Garver argues:

both trained and equipped to fight in the mountains
where most of the fighting in the war took place
(Patil 2007, 291–292). Despite their rapidly deteriorating relationship with China from 1960–1962, the
Indian government failed to improve security along
their border and suffered greatly for it.
Thankfully for the Indian military, the 1962 Sino-Indian War ended almost as suddenly as it began. On
November 21, 1962, almost exactly one month after
the start of the war, the Chinese government announced a ceasefire and ordered its troops to retreat
back into China to positions 20 kilometers behind
the original border (Hobday 1982, 256). Despite the
short duration of the war, Indian losses, in terms of
both territory and life, were massive. Well over 1,000
Indian soldiers were killed and many more were injured, and 2,000 square miles of northern Kashmir
were given to China as part of a 1963 agreement
between China and Pakistan (Devotta 2010, 100).
The defeat also had intangible impacts on the Indian psyche and national attitude. The crushing defeat that India suffered marked “a huge setback in
India’s confidence and international standing and
tilted the regional power balance in China’s favor”
(Malik 2011, 79). For the rest of the Cold War, India “embark[ed] on a ‘self-help’ strategy designed to
guarantee its security.” (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009,
5)

both sides bear onus for the 1962 war,
China for misconstruing India’s Tibetan
policies, and India for pursuing a confrontational policy on the border. (2006,
87)

The 1962 Sino-Indian War and Its
Aftermath
The worsening relationship between India and China came to a head on October 20, 1962 when the
PLA launched a massive ground assault at several
points along the Indian border. According to Wang,
small skirmishes between Chinese and Indian soldiers along the border had been occurring for several years before the outbreak of war, but these
clashes were never significant enough to prompt the
Indian government to adequately fortify their positions (2011, 450). The PLA possessed a massive numerical advantage over the Indians, outnumbering
them five-to-one, and caught the Indians completely
off guard (Devotta 2010, 100). Unsurprisingly, the
Chinese military was able to rapidly advance into
the disputed territories and establish control over
them. Indian positions in the Ladakh region of
the Aksai Chin and border outposts in Arunachal
Pradesh were almost immediately overrun in coordinated attacks (Rowland 1967, 166). In total, some
14,670 square kilometers of Indian territory were
taken over by Chinese forces (Devotta 2010, 100).
The Indian military was badly defeated because it
lacked readiness and the proper equipment. As mentioned earlier, the Indian government did not perceive an open war with China as a possibility and was
therefore not prepared for the invasion. There were
simply not enough Indian military units that were

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/10

India’s defeat to China led to several important immediate changes to foreign and military policy. First,
the Indian government dramatically increased the
amount of money spent on defense. From 1960–
1962, when the Sino-Indian relationship began to
deteriorate, defense spending as a percent of national revenue declined from 28% in 1960–1961
to 24.9% in 1961–1962 (Brecher 1968, 151). This
spending decrease was tied to Nehru’s belief that
China was not a threat:
Nehru was content once India had
gained relative supremacy over Pakistan
and did not pay attention to meeting the
challenges posed by China. (Patil 2007,
291)
This trend changed after the war. Net defense expenditure in 1962–1963 was $948.81 million USD,
an increase of 36% from 1961–1962 net expenditure ($608.03 million) and an increase of 45% from
102
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1960–1961 net expenditure ($519.86 million). (Patil
2007, 291)

view India as a rival trying to assert its dominance
over South Asia, while the Indian leadership still remembers the Chinese “betrayal” of 1962 and views
China’s involvement in the Indian Ocean and its
close relationship with Pakistan with concern. However, there have also been several important steps
made over the last two decades to bring the two
states closer together both economically and militarily. Recent military exchanges and joint training
exercises could indicate the beginning of increased
cooperation and a return to friendly relations.

Second, the Indian government began developing a nuclear strike capability to serve as a deterrent against another Chinese attack. In 1964, China
successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. At the
time, the Indian military was still recovering from its
defeat two years earlier and a second invasion was
seen by the Indian political and military elite as a real
possibility (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 98). Because
of the need for conventional rearmament and the
embarrassment of 1962, the Indian military did not
actively pursue the nuclear option. Instead, the civilian leadership took the lead on the program (Cohen
and Dasgupta 2010, 98). In 1974, India successfully
tested a nuclear device but not a truly functioning
weapon.

The reestablishment of diplomatic contact in 1976
was a major step in returning a sense of normalcy
to relations. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and
the rise of Deng Xiaoping played an important role
in improving Sino-Indian relations. Deng wanted to
rapidly improve China’s economy to bring it into the
ranks of the developed states by 2000 (Dreyer 2012,
116). A peaceful external environment was seen as
an important prerequisite for domestic economic
development. The Chinese government needed to
normalize relations with its neighbors in order to
successfully implement Deng’s ambitious modernization plan (Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Not everyone in
the Chinese government approved of Deng’s decision to reengage with India. Military hardliners and
CCP leaders in Tibet and the Yunnan province were
suspicious that the Indian government would provide support to ethnic minorities in Chinese territory (Holslag 2009, 43).

Third, for over a decade after the war, the Sino-Indian relationship was put on hold. There was a general
lack of political engagement between the two states,
and India viewed China with a high degree of mistrust. From 1962–1976 there was neither a Chinese
ambassador in New Delhi nor an Indian ambassador in Beijing (Wang 2011, 450). During this time
period, both states cultivated diplomatic relationships with other states. China approached Pakistan
as a major regional ally in the hopes that a strong
Pakistan would be able to confine India’s growing
power and geopolitical interests (Wang 2011, 457).
The Pakistani government officially recognized the
Aksai Chin as Chinese territory, and in 1963 it ceded
a portion of Kashmir to the Chinese (Devotta 2010,
112). The Chinese government came to Pakistan’s
aid in 1965, when it threatened “dire consequences”
against India should the Indian military push too far
into Kashmir (Watson 2002, 15–16). Meanwhile, India cultivated a closer relationship with the United
States and, after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the
Soviet Union, which had broken off friendly relations with China after the Sino-Soviet split in the
early 1960s (Malik 2011, 79).

High-level diplomatic exchanges followed the establishment of formal relations. However, these exchanges and contacts did not significantly improve
bilateral relations. In March 1978, a Chinese delegation visited New Delhi. In February 1979, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s foreign minister, visited China.
These visits and others like them “initiated the process of normalization of relations between India and
China”(Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Soon after these initial
visits, rounds of talks between Indian and Chinese
government officials began that aimed to solve the
border dispute that led to the 1962 war. These talks
dragged on throughout the 1980s with no tangible
results, due to several major setbacks (Al-Rfouh
2003, 24–25). In 1986, after the failure of the seventh round of talks, the Indian Parliament granted
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (Malik 2011, 85).
Chinese and Indian troops were mobilized along the

Lingering Mistrust and Attempts at
Cooperation
From the 1970s onwards, Sino-Indian relations have
been characterized by a sense of mistrust and suspicion. Many Chinese military and political leaders
Published by KnightScholar, 2014
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border after the act was passed, and there were media reports of armed skirmishes that could have led
to another war (Holslag 2009, 43). The late 1970s
and 1980s saw a reestablishment of diplomatic ties
between India and China, but the two states were
unable to reach a settlement on the border issue that
caused their relationship to collapse in the first place.

Despite closer economic and diplomatic ties, there
are two aspects of the Sino-Indian relationship that
remain contentious: the relationship between Pakistan and China, and media sources that encourage
mutual mistrust. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between Pakistan and China began in 1963,
when Pakistan ceded a portion of the Aksai Chin
to China (Devotta 2010, 112). Since the early 1960s,
the Pakistani military has greatly benefitted from its
relationship with China. Despite the close defense
relationship between the United States and Pakistan
since 9/11, China remains Pakistan’s largest supplier
of weapons, with Chinese-made weapons accounting for nearly 70% of Pakistan’s military hardware
(Malik 2011, 181–182).

During the 1990s, promising signs for cooperation
began to emerge in economic relations and trade.
In the early 1990s, Indian Finance Minister Manmohan Singh initiated significant reforms that helped
fuel an economic boom. The need for economic reform was spurred by an impending economic crisis
caused by Operation Desert Storm (spike in oil prices) and the end of the Cold War (loss of the Eastern European market) (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009,
11–12). Singh’s reform measures included cutting
tariffs, reducing restrictions on private enterprise,
and encouraging foreign direct investment into the
economy (Adams and Kirk 2010, 144). The reforms
were very successful, and have served as the base for
India’s rapid economic rise that has continued into
the twenty-first century. From 2005–2010, India’s
economy grew at an average annual rate of 8.5%
and was able to maintain a 7% annual growth rate after the 2008 global financial crisis (Sharma 2010, 77).

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has also received massive support from the Chinese government. The Chinese government first gave Pakistan
nuclear “know-how and technology” sometime in
the late 1980s or early 1990s (Devotta 2010, 114).
Initially, the support was intended to be for the development of civilian nuclear power plants (Watson
2002, 28). The Chinese government has continued
to support Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program,
providing Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium,
missiles, and the plants used to make the weapons
(Malik 2011, 182). Chinese support for Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program is seen as a major threat
by the Indian government and military given the
long history of conflict between India and Pakistan.

The mutual success of the Indian and Chinese economies has produced several positive steps towards
friendly Sino-Indian relations. In 1992, consulates
were reopened in Mumbai and Shanghai, two growing centers of international trade. One year later in
June, economic memoranda were signed that encouraged trade between the two states by reducing
double taxation in bilateral trade (Holslag 2009, 44).
Economic cooperation was initially very limited, the
1993 memoranda placed a limit of $160 billion USD
in total trade and only $3 million USD in investment, but it broadened throughout the 1990s and
2000s (Holslag 2009, 44). Two-way trade between
India and China reached $52 billion in 2008, and
two years later China became India’s largest trading
partner (Devotta 2010, 111). However, the trade relationship between India and China does not equally
benefit both states. India is running a massive trade
deficit. In 2010, bilateral trade was valued at $61.7
billion USD, but Chinese exports to India represent
$40.8 billion of total bilateral trade (Krishnan 2011).

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/10

The final military development that has hindered
closer Sino-Indian relations has been the construction of the “String of Pearls,” a series of port facilities in South Asian states near India. Since 2000, Chinese funding has secured access to ports in Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Wang 2011,
451). The new port at Gwadar, Pakistan is especially
worrying to the Indian government. The Pakistani
government has made statements that it is willing to
station Chinese troops at the facility, and Gwadar’s
status as a natural deep-sea port opens up the possibility of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines being
stationed close to India after many years of acrimony, chronic mistrust, and squandered opportunities
(Rehman 2012, 76). Fears of mass terrorism in the
wake of September 11 and subsequent revelations
of extensive proliferation emanating from Pakistan
added urgency to Western desires to preserve a mod104
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icum of crisis stability in South Asia, as well as to
prevent any form of escalatory behavior that could
spiral into nuclear conflict or further the spread of
radioactive material. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, the quest for a nuclear deterrent has frequently
been viewed as an imperative for second-rank powers desirous of maintaining a degree of strategic
autonomy with respect to prospective adversaries
that have vast nuclear or conventional superiority.
Chinese government officials and corporations have
claimed that these facilities exist solely to support
trade security and expand Chinese presence in new
markets (Bajaj 2010). However, Indian defense officials fear that the Indian Navy’s ability to maintain
military dominance over the Indian Ocean will be
eroded by these facilities (Pandya, Herbert-Burns,
and Kobayashi 2011, 22). In response to Chinese
involvement in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy
has sought out other states that could help bolster its
power. These include the states of Vietnam, South
Korea, and Japan, as well as the United States. The
Indian Navy’s relationship with the United States
Navy has become very deep. “India now conducts
more naval exercises with America than with any
other country” (The Economist 2013).

Chinese bloggers have also been inflammatory in
recent years, making statements that China could
break up the “Great Indian Federation” by taking
very little action (Banyan 2012). This kind of aggressive language has spread to Chinese strategic journals
and pro-Beijing Hong Kong media. In early 2006,
these news sources “published commentaries discussing the possibilities of a ‘limited border war’ to
‘teach India a lesson again’” (Malik 2011, 102). One
possible solution to the raging media war could be
a broader exchange of journalists between the two
states. There are only four Indian reporters based
in China, and very few Chinese reporters based in
India (Banyan 2012). Having a free exchange of
journalists might help de-sensationalize Sino-Indian
relations to the general public in both states, which
could lead to better bilateral relations.
The Sino-Indian relationship in the aftermath of the
1962 war has been characterized by a slow but steady
normalization of relations. The decades following
the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1976 saw
little progress in resolving the border dispute that
led to the 1962 war, but the mere fact that negotiations took place was a major step forward in bilateral
relations. The most promising area of cooperation
has been economic partnership. China has become
India’s largest trading partner, although a large trade
deficit still exists in China’s favor. Roadblocks to
normalization include China’s support for Pakistan’s
armed forces and nuclear program, the “String of
Pearls,” and a media war that is characterized by misinformation and sensationalized stories. Sino-Indian
relations are still far from being completely normalized, but if both states continue to build on the work
that has been done over the last 30 years then a positive, stable relationship between India and China
could be a reality.

The second major roadblock to close Sino-Indian
relations is mutual hostility on the part of the media.
India’s defeat in the 1962 war had a strong detrimental effect on its national psyche:
A “victim mentality” persists to this day
in India, “which plays [an] integral role
in defining Sino-Indian threat perceptions. (Saalman 2011b, 174)
This victim mentality plays out over the Internet
today, with private media outlets making fantastic
claims such as claiming that the Chinese wanted to
build an astronomical observatory in the Askai Chin
in an attempt to solidify its territorial claim (Banyan 2012). Indian media have also sensationalized
the threat posed by China by launching what Beijing
considers to be

India’s Military Modernization
and Its Effect on Foreign Policy

The Indian military’s modernization process has
focused on force projection. The Indian Navy and
Air Force have either purchased or developed many
new weapons systems that enable them to fight further from home. As of 2009, the Indian Navy was
the fifth largest in the world with 145 ships. This
number is projected to increase to over 160 ships by

an aggressive anti-China campaign…
over disputed borders, Tibet, UN reforms, unfair trade practices, terrorism,
and nuclear issues. (Malik 2011, 104)

Published by KnightScholar, 2014
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2022 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 82–83).
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force has been acquiring advanced fighter aircraft like the Dassault Rafale as well as support aircraft, like the C-17 heavylift transport plane. However, unlike the Chinese
military, which has domestically produced most of
its newest equipment, the Indian military is a major arms importer. In 2006, India surpassed China
to become the largest arms importer in the world
by dollar value (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, fig.
1–1). The Indian military has continued to be the
world’s largest arms importer. From 2007-2011, it
purchased over $21 billion worth of weapons from
foreign states (The Economist 2013). As of 2012,
“India continues to import approximately 70% of
its military hardware and produces only 30%” (Latif
and Lombardo 2012, 25). The development of a
strong domestic defense industry is both essential
for national security and necessary for India to become a major military power.

process. The segment of the budget that is most
concerned with military modernization is the capital outlay account, which is used for the procurement of equipment and other materials for the
Army, Navy, and Air Force (Latif and Lombardo
2012, 7). The 2012–2013 military budget included
a 15% increase in the capital outlay account from
Rs 69,198.81 crore to Rs 79,578.63 crore (Behera
2012). Taken together, the Navy and Air Force account for almost 70% of the capital outlay budget
for 2012–2013. Around 89% of the total capital outlay account was earmarked for modernization. The
Indian Navy has emerged as the leading force in the
military’s modernization and the 2012-2013 budget
reflects this. The Navy received a 72% increase in its
modernization budget, while the Air Force’s modernization budget only increased by 0.5% (Behera
2012). The Indian Army “has long been the beneficiary to the largest portion of India’s defense expenditure” (Saalman 2011a, 97). However, most of
the money budgeted for the Army is not earmarked
for modernization. The capital outlay budget of the
Indian military reveals a clear preference for the Air
Force and Navy, the two branches most responsible
for projecting force away from the homeland.

The Modernization of the Indian
Military
The economic reforms that were implemented in
the early 1990s by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao
and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh produced
a windfall that led to a substantial increase on defense spending. Brisk economic growth, coupled
with dangerous political-military events like the 1999
Kargil crisis and the 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament, encouraged the Indian government to spend
more on defense (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara
2009, 80). Since 2000, there has been a “74% realterm increase in India’s defense spending” (Latif
and Lombardo 2012, 5). This amounted to a budget
of about $40.8 billion for the 2012 fiscal year. The
only other Asian states that spend more on defense
than India are China and Japan. As of 2010, Indian defense spending was almost equal to Japanese
defense spending, but China was by far the biggest
spender in Asia (Latif and Lombardo 2012, fig. 1).
In March 2013, the Chinese government announced
that it would raise its defense budget by 10.7% to a
total of $114.3 billion, almost three times as much as
the Indian government spent in 2012 (Zhou 2013).

While the Indian government has approved more
and more spending on the modernization of the
armed forces, it has purposely made the acquisitions
process grindingly slow. Simply put,
India’s defense bureaucracy has historically showed an inability to spend all of
its defense budget…especially in the
capital outlay account. (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 9)
Since 2005, there has been chronic underspending in the capital outlay account, which is used for
modernization, and overspending in the revenue account, which is used for paying salaries and other
“day-to-day” expenses. This underspending problem is rooted in the Bofors scandal of 1989 in which
Indian defense officials were accused of taking kickbacks from Bofors, a Swedish artillery company, in
return for awarding contracts to Bofors (Cohen and
Dasgupta 2010, 11). In October 2006, A.K. Antony
was appointed as India’s defense minister “to ensure
that no Bofors-like scandal occurs within the Defense Ministry” (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 18). An-

A breakdown of the Indian defense budget reveals valuable information about the modernization
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tony’s scrupulous approach to fighting corruption
has led to significant acquisition delays that have
put the brakes on the military’s efforts to modernize. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this increased
scrutiny has actually reduced corruption (Latif and
Lombardo 2012, 18–19). The Indian military must
figure out a way to stop underspending in the capital
account in order to ensure that military modernization continues at a steady pace.

Indian government has approved funding for four
additional nuclear submarines like the Arihant (Ingersoll 2012). Despite the success in building and
testing the Arihant, the state of India’s shipyards is
a mixed bag. On the plus side for the Indian Navy,
Indian shipyards have been growing in
number and capacity and are slowly replacing many of the aging platforms for
the Indian navy’s growing global role.
(Latif and Lombardo 2012, 11)

The Indian Navy, the primary driver of the modernization process, has focused on creating a larger
fleet without sacrificing quality, while also purchasing support items such as maritime patrol and carrier-launched fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Indian
Navy’s ship inventory stood at around 150 ships of
all sizes, with 38 principle combatants (destroyers,
frigates, carriers, etc.) (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010,
71). Over the course of the next decade or two, the
fleet will first shrink in size to around 70 ships, as
obsolete ships are scrapped before bouncing back to
200 ships (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 11). So far, the
modernization process has mostly involved the purchase of foreign-made weapons systems. Between
1997 and 2000, the navy ordered two Kilo-class submarines and three frigates from Russia (Cohen and
Dasgupta 2010, 90). The most significant purchase
from Russia, however, has been the Vikramaditya (exAdmiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier. The Vikramaditya,
first launched in 1982, is supposed to replace the
1950s-era Viraat, India’s only other aircraft carrier
(Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 83). Unfortunately, the purchase has been beset with problems,
including a delivery delay and an increase in Russia’s
asking price for retrofitting the vessel (Cohen and
Dasgupta 2010, 90).

The modernization of the fleet is filling three major
shipyards, which are producing two aircraft carriers,
three destroyers, one large amphibious warfare vessel, and many other ships with more approved and
ready to be built (Till 2012, 93). Unfortunately, many
of these vessels won’t be completed for some time.
India’s fleet modernization may take much longer
than planned because India’s shipyards are only able
to deliver about one unit per year (Till 2012, 93–94).
The Indian Navy has acquired many ships in recent
years and is on its way toward a larger and more
modern fleet, but this modernization process may
take a long time to come to fruition unless India’s
shipyards can increase the rate of production.
While the Indian Navy had the largest increase in its
modernization budget, the Indian Air Force (IAF)
has gotten the most money for modernization over
the last ten years. From 2002–2012, the IAF has received over 30% of the capital outlay budget; this
peaked at 41% of the budget for 2010–2012 (Lombardo 2011, fig. 2). The large amount of money
needed for the IAF’s modernization has to do with
the high cost of aircraft and the rapid pace of technological development. The IAF is in a technology
trap because it “is caught between the enormous expansion of relevant technology and its astronomical
costs” (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). For example, the cost of a top-of-the-line fighter in 1979 was
about $8 million per unit, but the cost of a modern
top-of-the-line-fighter can be as high as $40 million,
not to mention the costs associated with maintaining
the aircraft over several decades (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). Despite the large share of the capital outlay budget that the IAF receives, it remains
below full operation strength. The IAF is authorized
to operate thirty-nine and a half squadrons and has
requested an increase to as many as forty-five squad-

The Indian Navy has not been completely reliant on
other states for its modernization needs. The most
important domestically made addition to the fleet
is the Arihant, a nuclear-powered submarine that is
the product of a collaboration between the Indian
Navy, Larsen & Toubro, and Russia (Cohen and
Dasgupta 2010, 90–91). The Arihant was launched
in 2009 and is undergoing sea trials after successfully
completing harbor trials in 2012. Once the Arihant
is fully operational, India will join the United States,
Great Britain, France, Russia, and China as the only
states with an underwater launch system for nuclear
missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012). The
Published by KnightScholar, 2014
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rons (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 11). However, as
of 2009 it only had enough aircraft for thirty-two
squadrons (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). The fact
that most modern military aircraft are produced in
foreign countries compounds their already high cost.

The IAF has also significantly improved its other capabilities via the purchase of foreign-made aircraft.
American companies have had much more success
in selling non-combat aircraft. Shortly after making
the announcement that American fighters would not
win the MRCA competition, the Indian government
approved a deal for ten Boeing C-17 cargo aircraft
worth $4.1 billion (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 3).
The C-17’s long range (2,785 miles) would give it the
IAF the ability to airlift troops and supplies throughout the Indian Ocean region (Cohen and Dasgupta
2010, 82). The United States has also sold the IAF
the smaller C-130 transport aircraft. In 2008, the
IAF bought six C-130s for $962 million and a deal
for six more C-130s was made in 2011 (Latif and
Lombardo 2012, 12–13). Other non-fighter aircraft
sales to India include the American-made Boeing P-8I Orion, which is used for coastal patrolling
and anti-submarine warfare, and the Israeli-made
A-50 Phalcon airborne early warning and control
(AWEC) aircraft (Saalman 2011a, 103–104). The
wide range of capabilities that the modern IAF possesses greatly enhances its power projection capabilities. However, this new capability has so far been
dependent on foreign states because India lacks a
strong defense industry.

India’s lack of a robust domestic defense industry is
especially noticeable for the IAF, which has had to
look abroad in its quest to modernize. Most of the
IAF’s new fighter aircraft are produced in India but
based off of Russian and European designs. Currently, the Russian-designed and Indian-produced
Su-30MKI is the primary air superiority fighter of
the IAF, with 170 in operation and over 200 more in
production (Menon 2013). In addition to maintaining air superiority over a hostile air force, the Su30MKI gives the IAF a “seeming qualitative edge
[over the Pakistani Air Force] that may […] translate
into air superiority in the next war” (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 84). The Su-30MKIs also have the capability to carry nuclear weapons, making them one
of the three legs of India’s nuclear triad (Saalman
2011a, 104). The IAF understands the importance
of the Su-30MKI’s power projection capabilities and
in 2009, the number of Su-30MKIs along the border with China was increased (Saalman 2011a, 104).
The other major air force modernization initiative was the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
competition, which was launched after the IAF requested a replacement for its aging fighter fleet (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The American-made
F/A-18 and F-16 were eliminated from the competition in April 2011 (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 2).
In January 2012, the Dassault Rafale was selected as
the winner of the competition. The IAF will buy
eighteen of the fighters “off the shelf ” (equivalent
to one squadron) and will build 108 of the fighters domestically with foreign assistance for a total
of 126 fighters (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The
contract is estimated to be worth $12 billion, but the
deal could expand to include as many as 220 aircraft
at a total cost between $25–30 billion over ten years
(Al Jazeera 2012a). The Su-30MKI and the Rafale
will provide the IAF with a technological edge and
could serve as a jump-start to the domestic defense
industry, as most of the fighters will be manufactured in India.
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The final major component of India’s military modernization is its nuclear forces, specifically the development of a “triad” of delivery capabilities. Until
recently, the Indian military only had the air- and
land-based delivery systems available. The Arihant
will give the Indian military the third leg of the triad
once it is fully operational. In late 2012, the twostage K-15 missile, which can be equipped with a
nuclear warhead, was successfully launched from
a submerged pontoon. Once the Arihant has completed all of its trials, it will be armed with twelve
K-15 missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012).
The Arihant gives India a second-strike capability to
respond to a nuclear attack that the other two legs
of the triad can’t reliably provide. According to Admiral Nirmal Verma, “[India’s] maritime and nuclear
doctrines will then be aligned to ensure our nuclear
insurance come from the sea” (Ingersoll 2012). The
Indian military’s push for a second-strike capability
is not without a good reason. In 1995,
China amended its No-First-Use. (NFU)
of nuclear weapons pledge to make it
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applicable to only nuclear-weapons-free
zones and to countries that had signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(NPT) …excluding India from its NFU
pledge. (Malik 2011, 42)

ons delivery systems like the INS Arihant and AgniV ballistic missile have completed India’s nuclear
triad and have provided the Indian military with a
viable second-strike capability. However, the Indian
military’s dependence on foreign states for modern
weapons technology must be overcome before India
can reach its full military potential.

The Arihant completes India’s nuclear triad by giving it a mobile launch system that is hard to destroy.
India now has a virtually guaranteed second-strike
capability, which significantly enhances its military
power.

The Effects of India’s Military
Modernization on Foreign Policy
India’s growing military power has had several lasting effects on its foreign policy and how other states
view India. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the
Indian government adopted a pragmatic foreign
policy most in line with the principles of realist
international relations theory (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 4). The Indian government is aware that
a stronger military allows it to carry more weight
in regional and international politics. For the most
part, Indian strategic thinking has stayed regional
(Ciorciari 2011, 62). The ability to exert influence
and project power into the Indian Ocean has been
one of the most important geopolitical issues for
the Indian armed forces for many years, but until
recently it has not possessed the capabilities to back
up their strategic goals. Military modernization has
also resulted in changes to Indian relations with foreign countries, especially the United States. Finally,
a modern Indian military could mean a greater role
for India in maintaining international peace and security. Piracy and terrorism are security issues that
affect multiple states and can only be defeated by
cooperation among many states. A modern navy and
air force would give India the ability to patrol the
Indian Ocean and keep South Asia’s sea-lanes open
to international trade.

Strategically, the Arihant was the most significant
addition to India’s nuclear weapons arsenal, but the
land and air legs of India’s triad have also received
major upgrades since 2000. As mentioned earlier, the
new Su-30MKI fighter aircraft have the capability to
be armed with nuclear weapons, a major upgrade
over the 1970s-era SEPECAT Jaguars and other aging nuclear delivery aircraft (Cohen and Dasgupta
2010, 81). The Indian Army operates several classes
of ballistic missiles with different ranges. The Agni
series of missiles are capable of hitting many Chinese cities. In April 2012, the latest Agni missile, the
Agni-V, was successfully test fired. The Agni-V has
a range of 5,000km, which is enough to hit almost
every major city in China, Iran, and Southeast Asia
(Al Jazeera 2012b). Immediately following the test,
Chinese officials released statements saying that the
Agni-V was not a serious threat to China. Liu Weimin, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, said,
We believe that both sides should cherish the hard-won good state of affairs at
present, and work hard to uphold friendly strategic cooperation […][and] make
positive contributions towards maintaining peace and stability in the region.
(BBC 2012)

Control of the Indian Ocean has long been a strategic imperative for India. Since the 1970s, “Indian
policy has articulated a suspicion of the military
presence of outsiders in the Indian Ocean” (Pandya,
Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 22). However,
throughout most of its history, India has been confined to a status as a continental power since former
colonial powers guaranteed the security of the seas
until India gained independence in 1947 (Winner
2012, 105). Throughout the Cold War, the Indian
navy lacked the necessary capabilities to keep other

India’s military modernization has aimed at creating
a military that can project power further afield with
conventional and nuclear weapons. The modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy will allow
the fleet to better patrol the Indian Ocean, which
is very strategically important. The acquisition of
modern aircraft like the Dassault Rafale, Su-30MKI,
and C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft allow the IAF
to have a fighting advantage over many other air
forces and gives them the capability to move troops
and supplies further from home. New nuclear weapPublished by KnightScholar, 2014
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states out of the Indian Ocean. Recently, the America, French, and British navies have all been very active in the region, but the Indian military does not
view their presence with suspicion, as most of their
operations have been focused on either monitoring
Iran or combating terrorism (Herbert-Burns 2012,
43–44).

oil. While estimates vary, most agree that Chinese oil
demand will double from 2000 to 2020, with foreign
sources accounting for 75% of Chinese demand by
2020 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 129).
Given their contentious past, the Chinese government fears that the Indian navy would close Indian
Ocean sea lanes should the two states come into conflict (Gordon 2010, 207). However, Indian military
leaders are wary of these facilities and are worried
about Chinese encirclement of India (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 127). This has produced a
classic security dilemma in the Indian Ocean. The
Chinese believe that having port facilities and a naval
presence in the Indian Ocean is vital to their security, but the Indian government views these facilities
as a security threat to India.

Chinese military interest in the Indian Ocean have
increased as China’s economy and foreign trade
has increased. Significant Chinese investments and
trading relationships with countries in East Africa
such as the Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania depend on Indian Ocean sea lanes (Pandya, HerbertBurns, and Kobayashi 2011, 20). In order to protect
these economic interests, the Chinese government
has invested money in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, and Bangladesh, also known as the “String of
Pearls.” Additionally, China depends on the Indian
Ocean for energy imports. In 2002, oil accounted
for about 20% of China’s energy consumption. Approximately half of this oil came from Saudi Arabia,
Angola, and Iran, and was shipped across the Indian
Ocean (Klare 2002, 110–111). From the oilfields
of Saudi Arabia to the Nile delta, from the shipping lanes of the South China Sea to the pipelines
of Central Asia, Resource Wars looks at the growing
impact of resource scarcity on the military policies
of nations. International security expert Michael T.
Klare argues that in the early decades of the new
millennium, wars will be fought not over ideology
but over access to dwindling supplies of precious
natural commodities. The political divisions of the
Cold War, Klare asserts, have given way to a global
scramble for oil, natural gas, minerals, and water.
And as armies throughout the world define resource
security as a primary objective, widespread instability is bound to follow, especially in those areas
where competition for essential materials overlaps
with long-standing territorial and religious disputes.
In this clarifying view, the recent explosive conflict
between the United States and Islamic extremism
stands revealed as the predictable consequence of
consumer nations seeking to protect the vital resources they depend on. Resource Wars is a muchneeded assessment of a changed world which takes
a compelling look at warfare in an era of rampant
globalization and intense economic competition. As
China’s economy has grown, so has its demand for
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The modernization of India’s navy has been aimed
at developing the capability to ensure a qualitative
and quantitative edge in the Indian Ocean region.
As mentioned earlier, the navy wants to have a fleet
of over 160 ships, three aircraft carriers, and 400
aircraft by 2020 (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). A fleet with three aircraft carriers
and modern submarines like the Arihant would allow India to assert itself as the dominant power in
the Indian Ocean (Saalman 2011a, 99–100). India’s
location next to the Indian Ocean, combined with
China’s geographic distance from the Indian Ocean,
will ensure that the Indian navy will always have a
more significant presence in the region, unless the
entirety of the Chinese Navy was moved to the Indian Ocean.
The Indian government has used their growing navy
in a variety of roles designed to enhance political
and security partnerships with states that border the
Indian Ocean. This is manifested by a “Look West”
policy,
that seeks to pro-actively engage western
Indian Ocean littoral states…via investment, trade, aid, and security arrangements. (Malik 2011, 341)
Since October 2008, Indian Navy ships have been
deployed to the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of
Somalia to arrest pirates and prevent piracy attacks
(Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118).
India has also signed security pacts with Qatar and
Oman, and conducts joint naval exercises with Ken110
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ya, Tanzania and South Africa (Malik 2011, 341).
However, the security environment in other states
like Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq has placed limits on
the effectiveness of the “Look West” policy (Dutta
2011, 139). India’s “Look West” policy has enjoyed
initial success, and is both a testament to the growing power capabilities of their modernizing navy as
well as an indication of India’s desire to cement its
presence across the Indian Ocean.

esi 2009, 10). Part of closer American–Pakistani ties
was military support, which caused the Indian government to enter into a closer military relationship
with the Soviet Union so as to not lose their military
superiority over a stronger Pakistan (Ganguly and
Pardesi 2009, 11). Throughout the Cold War, “Russia was forthcoming with its most advanced military
hardware” (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 14). During
the Cold War, a strong strategic relationship developed between India and the Soviet Union because
of American support for Pakistan.

In addition to forming security and political links
with African and Middle Eastern states, the Indian navy and government has reached out to states
in Southeast Asia as strategic regional allies. Most
of the contact between India and Southeast Asian
states so far has related to either security or economics. Economic partnerships include the signing
of a Free Trade Agreement with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2009 and the
forging of economic partnerships with Singapore
and Thailand (Dutta 2011, 139). The Indian military
has been active in Southeast Asia in a wide variety of
missions. After the massive 2004 earthquake, “the
Indian Navy deployed 27 ships and over 5,000 Naval
personnel in disaster relief operations […] it was the
first navy to reach the affected areas” (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). The Indian
Navy has also conducted joint exercises with Southeast Asian states, including Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Burma (Malik 2011, 352). India is using
its growing navy as a tool to increase its influence on
both sides of the Indian Ocean. By conducting disaster relief operations in Indonesia and conducting
counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia,
the Indian navy is promoting India’s strategic interests and creating a network of potential allies across
the region.

After the Cold War ended, Russia continued to reign
supreme in supplying arms to India. In 2000, India
and Russia signed a strategic partnership, and later
in the decade the two states “concluded a number of
pacts for military, technical, and economic cooperation” (Ciorciari 2011, 76–77). Russia is the only state
that supplies China with advanced weapons and other essential military hardware like jet engines (Dasgupta and Cohen 2011, 174). However, its willingness to supply India with top of the line hardware
like the Su-30MKI and a refitted aircraft carrier have
put the Indian military at ease. India’s pursuit of a
modern military has deepened its long-standing defense relationship with Russia, which has continued
to dominate the market for weapons sales to India.
France has emerged as India’s strongest defense
partner in Europe. When many states, including the
United States, condemned India’s 1998 nuclear tests
and imposed sanctions against India, the French
government refrained from implementing sanctions
(Latif and Lombardo 2012, 14). Several recent political actions have cemented a strong defense trade
relationship between France and India. In May 2011,
the French government decided to cease all sales
of heavy military equipment to Pakistan (Latif and
Lombardo 2012, 14–15). One month later, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced France’s support
for India becoming a permanent member of the UN
Security Council (“Britain, France Back India’s UN
Security Council Bid” 2011). The French have also
been one of India’s most reliable trading partners in
the field of technology transfers, which is an essential component of building a stronger domestic defense industry in India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010,
149). Most of the technology transfers from France,
as well as other major weapons suppliers like Russia,
has focused more on coproduction of equipment

India’s military modernization has also had a lasting
effect on its relationships with states far away from
the Indian Ocean. With the exception of the Arihant
submarine and the Agni-V ICBM, most of India’s
latest major weapons systems have come from foreign states. Russia is India’s preeminent arms partner, with Russian-made weapons accounting for
77% of India’s defense imports from 2000–2011
(Latif and Lombardo 2012, 14). This relationship
was first established in the 1970s, when the United
States moved closer to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Ganguly and PardPublished by KnightScholar, 2014
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and maintenance, which helps India keep foreign
weapons systems functioning but doesn’t help Indian companies develop their own equipment (Latif
and Lombardo 2012, 16). France’s political and
technological support was rewarded handsomely in
January 2012, when the Indian military selected the
French-made Dassault Rafale as the winning fighter
in the MRCA competition.

companies involved in proliferation]” in late 2001
(Saalman 2011a, 87).
In 2005, the United States and India reached a substantial civilian nuclear deal “which holds the promise of ending India’s nuclear isolation” (Ganguly and
Pardesi 2009, 15). The agreement promised to give
the Indian government access to nuclear technology
while allowing the Indian military to keep its nuclear
weapons. The Indian government pledged to prevent the transfer of materials between their civilian
and military nuclear programs, but diffusion of information will be hard to stop (Cohen and Dasgupta
2010, 167). The lifting of sanctions in 2001 and the
nuclear deal of 2005 helped repair Indo-American
relations to the point where significant American
arms sales to India became a possibility. Since 2002,
the United States has completed fifteen major arms
deals with India, valued at approximately $8.83 billion. This figure only accounts for major conventional hardware like transport aircraft, missiles, and
the like; it does not include smaller sales like specialforces equipment and small arms (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 12–13).

The state that has come the furthest in its relationship with India as a result of military modernization
has been the United States. A significant trust deficit existed between India and the United States due
to American support for Pakistan during the Cold
War and American hostility towards India’s nuclear
weapons program (Latif and Lombardo 2012, 28).
The Indian government’s refusal to sign the NPT
because:
“it believed the treaty discriminated
against states without nuclear weapons
capability and…did nothing to stem nuclear proliferation among countries with
nuclear weapons,” was a particular sore
spot between the two states. (Devotta
2010, 114)

American arms sales have accompanied more frequent contact between the American military and its
Indian counterpart. The American and Indian navies have been especially active in joint operations.
In 2002, they worked together to export high-value
ships through the Malacca Strait. When major natural disasters struck Southeast Asia in 2004 and 2008,
the American and Indian navies provided disaster
relief on short notice (Malik 2011, 337). U.S. Navy
pilots have trained Indian pilots in carrier operations,
which will be essential as the Indian Navy acquires
more aircraft carriers (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010,
174). The United States has become India’s closest
partner in terms of joint military exercises (Malik
2011, 337). These exercises have allowed the two
militaries to engage in closer defense collaboration.
Sharing techniques and equipment via arms sales,
“allows for greater personal interaction between
militaries, [and] joint training on tactics” (Latif and
Lombardo 2012, 21). The growing American defense trade relationship with India has had spillover
effects in the form of joint training exercises and enhanced interoperability, which will allow Indian and
American forces to react to crises more effectively.

When India tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, the
United States placed “wide-ranging” sanctions on
India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 13). The political
and security relationship between the United States
and India during the Cold War and the 1990s was
characterized by mistrust brought on by diverging
international security interests.
The dawn of the twenty-first century ushered in a
new international security environment and opened
up the door for a stronger relationship between the
United States and India. In 2000, President Bill Clinton visited India, which was the first visit by a sitting
American president since 1978 (Saalman 2011a, 87).
Clinton was able to lay the groundwork for improving bilateral relations. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 provided the final push necessary
for India and the United States to fundamentally
change their relationship. India was the first country
to come out in support of the global “War on Terror” (Devotta 2010, 114). The United States acted
quickly and “conducted a large scale removal of
Indian companies from the US Entity List [list of
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Chinese analysts have been dismissive toward India’s domestic defense industry, despite the fact that
the Chinese military has also relied on foreign military technology (Saalman 2011a, 98). Despite the
weaknesses of India’s defense industry, its growing
military power has propelled it into the forefront
of Chinese strategic thinking. Chinese analysts are
increasingly de-hyphenating India from Pakistan in
their writing, indicating that “India’s military modernization is no longer couched solely within the
India-Pakistan dynamic” (Saalman 2011b, 93–94).
The United States has also taken a strategic interest
in India. This marks a significant change from the
early days of the Cold War, when:

and airspace around China. This is known as an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) approach to warfare. China’s pursuit of A2/AD capabilities began
in earnest in the early 1990s, when it started devoting more of its defense budget to the modernization
of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In
1991, around 32% of China’s defense budget went
to its navy (Till 2012, 85). However, the pace of
naval modernization in the early 1990s was still slow
and plagued with difficulties. In 1995, China unveiled the Luhu, its first indigenously built modern
destroyer. The ship was
derided as a hodgepodge of Western
equipment that was already at least one
generation behind warships from the developed world. (Holmes and Yoshihara
2008, 88)

the United States was virtually ignorant
of India and had few cultural, strategic,
or economic links with [India]. (Ganguly
and Pardesi 2009, 5)

During this early phase of modernization, the PLAN
tried to bring in technology from states with more
advanced navies (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). In
the early 1990s, the PLAN’s modernization push ran
into difficulties and was more dependent on foreignmade weapons systems.

China’s Military Modernization
and Its Effects on Foreign Policy

The rise of China’s military has been one of the
most rapid and impressive in living memory. According to data from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) military expenditure database, China’s total defense spending has increased from $37.04 billion in 2000 to $157.6 billion
in 2012, an increase of 325%. Unlike India’s military modernization process, which has heavily relied
on foreign arms suppliers for the latest and greatest
military hardware, China has domestically developed
and produced many of their modern weapons systems. Between 2008 and 2012, Chinese arms exports
rose by 162%, launching China into fifth place on
the list of the world’s largest arms exporters (Anderlini and Mallet 2013). The types of equipment the
Chinese have been developing are focused on two
military missions: force projection and asymmetric
warfare. This is slightly different than India’s focus
on force projection and the nuclear triad.

The PLAN’s fortunes began to change in the mid1990s, and the fleet went through a period of rapid
change from 1996 to 2006. The quantitative change
of the fleet during this time period was modest. By
2006, the PLAN only had nine additional destroyers, eight additional frigates, and five fewer tactical submarines (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, 88).
However, the qualitative changes to the fleet were
significant. Many of the PLAN’s outdated major
surface combatants were decommissioned during
this period (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). Another major qualitative change was a shift away from
building smaller ships in favor of fewer, bigger, and
more powerful ships. Between 1996 and 2006, “five
entirely new classes, featuring displacements from
6,000 to nearly 8,000 tons, entered the fleet” (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, 88). The logic behind this
decision is that larger ships are both harder to sink
and have the ability to carry more systems that are
essential for an A2/AD mission, such as advanced
radar and area-air-defense missile systems (Till 2012,
89). These new vessels contributed to a major “bulking up” of the PLAN’s capabilities, but there are
some key capabilities that the PLAN has yet to de-

The Modernization of the Chinese
Military
China’s military modernization process has focused
on the development of weapons systems that are
designed to seize and maintain control over the sea
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velop. In 2006, the PLAN still lacked the command
and control capabilities, coordination, and targeting
support systems that qualify a navy as truly modern
(McVadon 2006, 94). The decade of 1996–2006 saw
some major qualitative improvements in the PLAN’s
ship inventory that made up for the number of outdated ships decommissioned and removed from the
fleet.

ing business practices (Department of Defense
2010, 43). These policies, combined with the ability
of Chinese arms manufacturers to integrate with civilian firms, have significantly reduced the military’s
dependence on foreign suppliers. The production
of high-quality indigenous vessels like Song-class
submarines and Luyang II destroyers shows how
far China’s military industry has advanced since the
1990s (Till 2012, 86). By 2025, the PLAN’s structure
will likely include at least two aircraft carriers, six to
eight new nuclear attack submarines, and several additional ballistic missile submarines (Duchatel and
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33). A strong domestic shipbuilding industry will be essential to China’s national
security goals.

The PLAN has continued its modernization at an
impressive clip since 2006, and has added many new
ships and other support systems to its inventory. In
2012, the PLAN had a total of 78 principle surface
combatants and 71 submarines in a fleet of 876 vessels (Till 2012, 86). The PLAN has assembled this
fleet by both importing high-quality ships and weapons systems from abroad (primarily Russia), while
also developing advanced indigenous systems that
utilize domestically-produced technology (“The
PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.” 2010, 353). The
story of the Liaoning is an excellent example of how
the PLAN has blended foreign and domestic development of its ships. In 1998, the Chinese purchased
the Varyag, a Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, from the Ukraine (Department of Defense
2010, 2). The Varyag was delivered essentially as just
a hull, lacking engines and other critically important
systems. In 2011, the PLAN completed outfitting
the vessel with these systems and the Varyag, now
called the Liaoning, began sea trials (Axe 2011c). In
September 2012, the Liaoning was commissioned
into service. By serving on the Liaoning, PLAN service members will gain valuable experience in aircraft carrier operations. There is also evidence that
the PLAN is developing a program to produce its
own carrier-based fighter aircraft as well as its own
aircraft carriers (Till 2012, 90). The Liaoning aircraft
carrier is an example of the new major surface vessels that the PLAN has been adding to its fleet in recent years, as well as an example of how the PLAN
has blended domestic technology with foreign ship
design.

The Chinese military’s pursuit of A2/AD capabilities has also been manifested in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is
currently undergoing a transformation from a force
structured for domestic defense to being able to operate further from China in both offensive and defense roles (Department of Defense 2010, 25). The
PLAAF’s airlift and aerial refueling capabilities have
been especially focused on as being areas ripe for
modernization. In January 2013, the PLAAF ran a
successful test flight of the Xian Y-20 transport aircraft (Axe 2013). The Y-20 would give the PLAAF a
much-needed heavy airlift capability, which could be
used to transport soldiers and equipment in times of
war and help rescue crews and emergency services
workers reach natural disaster areas (Department of
Defense 2010, 34). Aerial refueling enables fighter
aircraft to stay in the air longer and fly further away
from bases. In order for China to become a true regional power, it must posses a strong aerial refueling
capability. In 2011, the PLAAF operated only fourteen tankers, each carrying 17,000 kg of fuel. To put
this in perspective, the US Air Force has more than
500 tankers, which can carry around 100,000 kg of
fuel (Axe 2011b). Having strong airlift and aerial refueling capabilities will be an essential part of the
PLAAF’s modernization in the coming years.

The example of the Liaoning is becoming the exception to the rule of PLAN reliance on foreign-made
ships. Overall, the PLAN has tried to shift away
from relying on foreign shipbuilders. Since the late
1990s, the Chinese government has worked to create
a domestic defense industrial base by streamlining
bureaucracy, boosting quality control, and improvhttps://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/10

In order for China’s A2/AD strategy to be effective,
it must possess the ability to control the skies and
deny an enemy air force from operating over China.
In 2000, the PLAAF had around 2,500 fighter aircraft, but this number has dwindled as 1960s and
1970s era fighters like J-6s and J-7s have been retired
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in favor for more modern planes like J-10s and J-11s
(Axe 2011a). Before joint producing the J-11 with
the Russians and developing the J-10, the PLAAF
purchased Su-27s and Su-30MKK/MKK2s from
the Russians. By 2007, the PLAAF had 280 of these
Russian-made fighters (Gregory 2012, 16). While
most of the PLAAF’s newer planes like the J-10 and
J-11 are technically domestically produced, they are
based on foreign designs (usually Russian) and are
either the product of foreign-assisted development
and/or licensed production (Liff and Erickson
2013, 7). If current trends in the PLAAF’s acquisition process continue, then it should have around
1,000 fighter aircraft by 2020, but most of them will
be modern planes (Axe 2011a). Like the PLAN, the
PLAAF has been forced to retire many of its outdated pieces of equipment, but both services have
gained a significant qualitative improvement in their
capabilities.

PLAN has focused on acquiring advanced anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs) and over the horizon targeting systems (OTHT) to engage enemy ships from
a distance (“The PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.”
2010, 353). In addition to these cruise missiles, “the
Chinese are…developing ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit ships
at sea” (McVadon 2006, 93). One such missile is the
DF-21, a medium-ranged ballistic missile that has
been specifically designed to target aircraft carriers.
If the DF-21 is deployed successfully, then it would
be the first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capable
of hitting a moving aircraft carrier (Erickson 2010).
Having the capability to destroy moving aircraft carriers without risking dozens of aircraft and ships in
a frontal assault gives the Chinese military the ability
to prevent any large naval force from coming too
close to its coastline.
The key difference between China and India’s military modernization processes is China’s booming
domestic defense industry. Since the late 1990s, the
Chinese government has made several policy changes that have helped defense-related companies thrive
(Department of Defense 2010, 43). The rapid expansion of China’s civilian economy has been very
beneficial for defense companies. By integrating
with civilian firms, defense firms have been able to
improve in the areas of research and development
(R&D) and production (Department of Defense
2010, 43). One of the effects of increased domestic weapons production has been increased arms
exports. Chinese arms exports “increased a total of
95 per cent between the 2002–2006 period and the
2007–2011 period” (Liff and Erickson 2013, 8). In
March 2013, China overtook the United Kingdom to
become the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter (Anderlini and Mallet 2013). However, the true size of
China’s domestic defense industry is hard to determine because the government does not release any
information about the equipment it produces (Liff
and Erickson 2013, 7). China’s domestic defense industry has grown substantially in recent years and is
much more developed than India’s domestic defense
industry.

The final major component of China’s A2/AD
strategy is its missile arsenal. According to the Department of Defense, “China has the most active
land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in
the world” (Department of Defense 2010, 1). The
Chinese military has developed an impressive missile
arsenal that could be used to strike against enemy
ships and bases that would otherwise be unreachable by the PLAN or PLAAF. Many western analysts believe that China’s missile arsenal is “directed
specifically at deterring, delaying, or complicating
timely and effective American access and intervention” should China make an aggressive move against
Taiwan (McVadon 2006, 92). Despite the qualitative
improvements that have been made to the PLAN
and PLAAF, the two branches still lack the number
of planes and ships needed to stop the three to four
U.S. carrier battle groups that would respond to a
crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Kim 2012, 364). The Chinese military has turned to missiles to make their
A2/AD strategy credible. In 2011, the Chinese military had as many as 2,000 non-nuclear ballistic and
cruise missiles (Axe 2011b). In order to make up for
not having enough ships and planes, the Chinese
military has invested in building a large missile arsenal to ensure that its A2/AD strategy works.

Despite the growth of its domestic defense industry, the Chinese military still relies on other states
for some of its most advanced equipment. From
2008–2012, China was the world’s second largest

Some of the missiles that the Chinese military has developed have highly advanced targeting systems and
pose a significant threat to enemy surface warships.
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arms importer behind India (Anderlini and Mallet 2013). The reason for China’s double status as
one of the world’s largest arms exporters and importers has to do with the types of weapons being exchanged. Most of China’s weapons imports
(69%) come from Russia (Anderlini and Mallet
2013). These imports represent key technologies
that China either has not developed or cannot massproduce, such as high-performance aircraft engines
(Liff and Erickson 2013, 8). The Y-20 transport aircraft is a good example of how China’s domestic
defense industry still relies on foreign suppliers for
key pieces of equipment. The Y-20 was made by the
Xian Aircraft Industrial Corporation, but instead of
having purpose-designed engines the plane is fitted
with Russian-made engines (Axe 2013). Chinese defense industries have come a long way in producing
equipment and creating a strong base for domestic
weapons manufacturing to build upon, but it still relies on foreign suppliers, especially Russia, for more
advanced weapons technology.

has become increasingly willing to contribute to international peace and stability in order to maintain a
status quo that allows it to grow economically and
to prove that it is a responsible state to the international community.
The growing power of China’s Navy and Air Force
has made Chinese claims over disputed territories in
the East and South China Seas more credible. The
South China Sea’s (SCS) strategic importance to the
Chinese military has to do with energy security and
international trade. In 2009, the SCS was the world’s
busiest shipping lane. Over half of the world’s supertanker traffic passes through the SCS (Hong
2009, 42). China is dependent on SCS shipping lanes
for a large share of its oil imports. Oil accounts for
about 20% of China’s energy consumption, and just
under half of this oil (49%) is shipped from Saudi
Arabia, Angola, and Iran (Department of Defense
2010, 20). There are also substantial oil reserves underneath the SCS. The exact amount of oil under
the SCS is not known. A 2011 article in The New York
Times estimated that the SCS had 61 billion barrels
worth of oil and natural gas, with another 54 billion
barrels that could be discovered (Landler 2011). According to a Chinese estimate cited in a U.S. Energy
Information Administration Report, there could
be as many as 213 billion barrels of oil under the
SCS (US Energy Information Administration 2008).
Even though the exact amount of oil under the SCS
is not known, it is clear that the state which has control over the SCS will have a strategic advantage over
many other states that rely on the SCS as a conduit
for energy imports.

The modernization of China’s armed forces has
focused on an A2/AD approach to warfare. In the
event of a conflict, the PLAN and PLAAF want to
rapidly seize control of the sea and sky, respectively,
and prevent another military from wresting control
away from them. To this end, the military has acquired modern ships, airplanes, and non-nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles to strike enemy ships from
a distance. China’s land forces have been receiving
money for modernization as well, but the developments for the PLAN and PLAAF have been much
more significant in formulating China’s A2/AD
strategy.

The geostrategic importance of the SCS has prompted China to take a very active stance in asserting and
defending its territorial claims. The Strait of Malacca
is at the west end of the SCS. It is considered one of
China’s sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) and is
a major choke point for shipping into the SCS. The
Chinese government views the presence of the Indian and American navies along this SLOC as a major threat to Chinese economic and energy security
(Malik 2011, 206–207). Within the SCS itself, China’s military modernization has spurred what some
analysts consider to be a naval arms race among
Southeast Asian claimants to the SCS. The states of
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei have all increased the size of their navies by ei-

The Effects of China’s Military
Modernization on Foreign Policy
China’s military modernization has given it a great
deal of power in a short amount of time. This has
produced two trends in Chinese foreign policy.
First, the Chinese military and government have
been more assertive in defending contested territorial claims like islands in the South China Sea and
the Senkaku Islands which are currently claimed by
Japan. Second, Chinese foreign policy has become
much more responsible in a variety of issue areas,
especially its relationship with North Korea. China
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priority and…a guiding principle…for
China’s maritime policies. (Duchatel and
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33)

ther buying or producing modern warships (Klare
2002, 129–130). However, none of these states have
the ability to oppose China unless they take collective action. In 2011, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had
a fleet of 680 fixed-wing aircraft, 412 surface ships
and eight submarines (Cordesman and Hammond
2011). This combined force could serve as a deterrent to China, but ASEAN is an economic and political union, not a mutual defense organization. In the
absence of treaty obligation that would draw all of
ASEAN into conflict with China, should China attack islands in the SCS, the Chinese military has little
to fear from the other claimants (Dillon 2011, 63).

The acquisition of the Liaoning aircraft carrier gives
the PLAN the ability to put strike aircraft anywhere
in the SCS, giving them a significant military advantage over all of the other claimants, none of which
possess an aircraft carrier (McVadon 2006, 102).
The acquisition of more attack submarines and larger surface combatants also make for a more threatening PLAN presence in the SCS. The PLAN’s expanded submarine fleet would likely operate with the
Liaoning and its aircraft, with the carrier providing air
cover and defense for the submarines which would
engage enemy ships with anti-ship missiles (Duchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 35).

The Chinese military has been very active in defending claims to the SCS. In 1992, The National
People’s Congress adopted the Law of the PRC
Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, which effectively codified China’s claim over
the SCS into domestic law (Holmes and Yoshihara
2008, 52). After the law was passed, the frequency
of clashes between Chinese forces and other claimant states increased significantly. Between 1992
and 2002, there were fifteen reported incidents of
military clashes in the SCS, ten of which China was
involved in. A period of relative stability began in
2002 when ASEAN and China released the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC). The DOC established a status quo that
the claimants would seek diplomatic solutions to territorial disputes (Department of Defense 2010, 39).
However, Chinese efforts to modernize their navy
have begun to upset the balance of power, and the
stability that was established by the DOC is beginning to strain. The SCS falls into the same category
of geopolitical interest areas as Tibet and Taiwan
for China’s government, considered to be “core interests” (Malik 2011, 24). The Chinese military has
used force in the past to assert China’s claims over
Tibet and Taiwan, so the use of force in the SCS is a
very real possibility.

Actions by Chinese forces in the SCS over the last
four years have ratcheted up tension. Some analysts
believe that China’s foreign policy towards the SCS
took an assertive turn beginning in 2009 (Kim 2012,
362). There were several incidences involving American and Chinese naval forces in 2009. In the spring,
PLAN ships harassed the USNS Impeccable and
Victorious, two surveillance ships. In June, a PLAN
submarine collided with a sonar array towed by the
USNS John McCain (Dillon 2011, 56). In 2010, a Defense Department report to Congress stated that a
new PLAN base on Hainan Island was “essentially
complete”:
The base is large enough to accommodate a mix of attack and ballistic missile
submarines and advanced surface combatants. (Department of Defense 2010,
2)
In 2012, a PLAN frigate ran aground on a disputed
island, “raising regional suspicions that Beijing was
trying to bolster its claim to the entire South China
Sea” (Kurlantzick 2012). Chinese officials have also
ramped up rhetoric about their claims to disputed islands, and the government has repeatedly sent ships
close to areas claimed by other states.

Recent developments in the SCS have confirmed its
importance to China’s foreign policy. According to
Duchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix:

Chinese actions in the SCS have been more aggressive and assertive in recent years, but in many other
issue areas Chinese foreign policy has become more
tempered as its military has modernized. China’s
“fourth generation” of leaders (Hu Jintao era) “pur-

Gaining effective control over its claimed
Exclusive Economic Zone. (EEZ) in
the…South China Sea stands out as a
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sued a [foreign] policy of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’ that relies more on reassurance
and incentives than on coercion or power politics”
(Wang 2011, 441). One major change to China’s foreign policy that stems from the “peaceful rise” model has been the way China interacts with multilateral
institutions. The Chinese government has realized
that engaging these organizations “helps promote
the country’s trade and security interests” (Wang
2011, 442). The modernization of China’s military
did not cause Chinese foreign policy to undergo
this shift by itself; rather it was a piece of a larger
move towards multilateralism that was encouraged
by China’s overall development. In order to gain the
trust and respect of the international community,
the Chinese government must use its new military
power responsibly.

China filled the economic void left after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, helping keep North Korea’s
economy afloat after the end of the Cold War in addition to providing North Korea with badly needed
energy resources. Before the Soviet Union collapsed,
it was North Korea’s major economic provider. By
the end of 1990, North Korea owed about $4 billion to the Soviets (Lee 1996, 138). Once Soviet economic assistance dried up, North Korea relied on
China for most of its economic aid. In 1993, just
three years after Soviet assistance stopped, China’s
share in North Korea’s total foreign trade was 34%
(Lee 1996, 139). China’s commitment to North Korea’s energy security also has a long history. In January 1976, the China-Korea Friendship Pipeline was
completed, supplying North Korea with oil at belowmarket prices. Chinese engineers and technicians
helped build North Korea’s energy infrastructure by
constructing oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and
other related structures (Lee 1996, 134–135). North
Korea’s reliance on China as an energy supplier has
increased dramatically since the Cold War. In 2011,
“China alone account[ed] for 70% to 90% of North
Korea’s fuel imports” (Malik 2011, 253).

In recent years, the most major strategic change in
Chinese foreign policy has to do with its relationship
with North Korea. China’s relationship with North
Korea began in 1950, when a nascent Communist
China sought the support of the Soviet Union as a
counterweight to the United States. By supporting
North Korea in the Korean War, the Chinese government hoped to:

In 2010, China’s response to two major provocations by North Korea indicated the importance of
North Korea to China’s foreign policy. In March
2010, a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, was
sunk off the coast of North Korea. Once North
Korea was named as the culprit in the sinking, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao offered condolences for the
sailors killed, but stopped short of criticizing North
Korea for its action (Sang-hun 2010). The Chinese
government reacted similarly to the bombardment
of the island of Yeonpyeong by North Korean artillery in November 2010. China’s unwillingness to put
pressure on North Korea for its aggressive actions
in 2010 could be connected to North Korea’s Rajin
naval base. The North Korean government has allowed Chinese military forces to use the base, giving China a naval presence in the Sea of Japan for
the first time (Malik 2011, 270). Also in 2010, Wen
Jiabao offered a $10 billion aid package to North
Korea, which undermined UN sanctions designed
to prevent North Korea from receiving international
assistance (Malik 2011, 270–271).

demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow and
vividly underscore the threat the United
States posed to all socialist states. (A.
Goldstein 2006, 133)
Throughout the Cold War, China was a major ally
of North Korea, and provided North Korea with
significant economic and military support to prop
it up as a buffer against American interests in East
Asia. During the 1960s and 1970s, “several hundred
North Korean experts were trained in […] nuclear
technologies in China” (Malik 2011, 237). North
Korea’s arsenal of ballistic missiles include some
models, like the Taepo Dong, that have their origins
in Chinese ballistic missile technology (Malik 2011,
237). However, the main supplier of conventional
weapons to North Korea was the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian government attempted to remain active in North Korea,
but a significant economic crunch in the mid-1990s
severely limited the possibility of continued Russian
support (Harada 1997, 68).
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China’s reaction to North Korea’s successful nuclear
test in February 2013 should have been minimal.
Instead, the Chinese government has been active in
both denouncing the nuclear test and has played a
major role in bringing multilateral pressure against
the North Korean government. Less than one
month after the test, the UN Security Council unanimously approved new economic sanctions against
North Korea that were drafted by the U.S. and China
(Gladstone and Sanger 2013). This is not the first
time that China has supported sanctions against
North Korea in response to nuclear tests. Successful nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 caused the Security Council to approve sanctions, and both times
China voted in favor (Lim 2013). However, the 2013
sanctions seem to have produced a much stronger
reaction from the Chinese government and could
indicate a major shift in Chinese policy towards
North Korea. According to an article in The New
York Times, “A more heightened debate about North
Korea is now swirling around China’s foreign policy
circles” (Perlez 2013). One side of this debate has
argued that China should cooperate with the United States to curb North Korea’s nuclear program,
which would be a major step in proving to the world
that China is a responsible player in the international
system.

The Bank of China’s decision to close its doors to
North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank is a major symbolic act, showing how serious the Chinese government is about becoming a responsible member in
the international system.
It is too early to tell whether or not China’s foreign
policy towards North Korea will be significantly
changed in the long term, but China’s actions in response to the February 2013 nuclear tests have been
the harshest to date. This indicates a willingness on
the part of China to be a more responsible member of the international community. As China modernizes militarily and economically, it will likely be
faced with more situations when it will have to make
a trade-off and follow the will of the international
community instead of acting solely in accordance
with its interests. The ability to compromise national
goals for the sake of international peace and stability is the mark of a great power. China is developing
the military of a great power, but it will not be a
true great power until it uses its military and political
clout to create and protect a positive environment
for all states to exist within.

An Asian Arms Race?

The question of whether or not China and India
are engaged in an arms race is an important one to
answer. Arms races breed instability as two states
develop deadlier weapons in an attempt to stay one
step ahead of each other. What starts as two states
trying to secure their own survival and protection
against one another usually ends in warfare as any
miscommunication or misperception can rapidly escalate into war. State resources get focused on making better weapons and not on other causes like providing healthcare and education to its citizens (Till
2013). Thankfully, China and India do not appear
to be engaged in an arms race. Instead, both states
are going through a “natural” phase as they acquire
militaries that better reflect their growing power and
importance in the international system.

While it is too soon to definitively state whether or
not China will substantially change its foreign policy towards North Korea, there are some promising signs that it will keep up the pressure to bring
the nuclear program to heel. On May 7, 2013, the
state-controlled Bank of China declared that it had
ended all dealings with North Korea’s Foreign Trade
Bank, a “key North Korean bank” (Bradsher and
Cumming-Bruce 2013). The Chinese government
has encouraged state-controlled enterprises, which
make up a large portion of the Chinese economy
and strategic industries, to cease dealing with North
Korea to ensure that the latest round of international sanctions have more weight. According to a
Chinese professor of Korean Studies at Fudan University:

Although India and China do view each other with
suspicion and consider one another to be rivals, their
main threat perceptions are directed elsewhere. This
is reflected in the types of weapons both states are
acquiring. India’s military is geared toward conventional power projection, while China’s military is

this appears to be a step by the government to show that it’s willing to cooperate with the international community.
(Bradsher and Cumming-Bruce 2013)
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specifically developing capabilities that are focused
on an A2/AD war fighting strategy. If the two states
were in an arms race with one another, then they
would be trying to develop capabilities that countered one another, but this is not happening. The
political and military leadership of both states have
made efforts to increase cooperation and reduce the
chances that a dispute could get out of hand and
flare up into all-out war. Arms races in the past have
tended to eat up a large portion of state resources,
but both China and India have experienced such
massive economic growth that military spending
is taking up a very small percent of their national
spending. The absence of an arms race between
India and China neither removes the possibility of
armed conflict nor prevents strategic rivalry, but it
does lessen the prospect of war and allows more opportunities for cooperation to exist that can hopefully lead to a friendly relationship between the two
states.

states, such as the size of a state’s military or the
economy (Wohlforth 1999, 10). The problem of
focusing solely on power capabilities as a predictor
of state behavior is that it ignores important factors
that determine state behavior. One such factor is
how states perceive the intentions of other states, or
the “threat” that other states pose. In 1985, Stephen
M. Walt started to take threat into account when he
asserted that states will balance “against the threats
posed by the power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions of others” (Walt 1985, 18 emphasis added).
Walt examined the behavior of the Soviet Union
and alliance formation of states to explain how balance of threat theory explains state behavior. In
response to a powerful economic and military alliance headed by the United States, the Soviet Union
began devoting considerable economic resources
to its military. The military then developed a force
posture and doctrine that put emphasis on offensive
capabilities. This focus on offense “increase[ed] the
level of threat that Soviet neighbors perceive” (Walt
1985, 37). This caused many of the Soviet Union’s
neighbors to be wary and actually drove them closer
to the United States and its allies. Soviet aggression
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, as well as heavyhanded policies in Eastern Europe, caused many
independent neighboring states to see the Soviet
Union as a threat (Walt 1985, 37). Threat perceptions were therefore a major factor in determining
the behavior of weaker states near the Soviet Union.
These states feared the Soviet Union because of the
Soviet’s aggressive foreign policy, and many of these
states began forming closer relationships with states
that were opposed to the Soviet Union.

India and China are not in an arms race because they
do not perceive one another as their primary threat.
Of course, two states do not have to perceive of
one another as their primary threat in order to be
in an arms race. However, threat perceptions play
a big role in the types of military capabilities that
states develop. A state will not put that much effort
into developing weapons technology and military
doctrine to counter another state that it does not
perceive as a threat. If the balance of threat theory
is applied to the Sino-Indian relationship, it is clear
that while both states perceive each other as potential threats, the states they perceive as greater threats
are not one another. Additionally, both states have
engaged in activities that have reduced their threat
perception of one another.

In the case of Sino-Indian relations, both states perceive each other to be a threat to some degree. A useful benchmark for determining threat perceptions is
examining what strategic and military experts think
of another state’s military modernization process.
India’s military modernization began receiving attention in Chinese academic journals in 2000, the
year when President Bill Clinton visited India. Soon
after Clinton’s visit, the United States began lifting
sanctions on India that had been in place since 1974,
which allowed the United States to reemerge in the
Indian defense market (Latif and Lombardo 2012,
12). From 2000 onward,

Balance of threat theory is a modification to balance
of power theory, which are both affiliated with the
Neorealist School of international relations theory.
According to neorealists, states are constantly trying
to tip the balance of power in their favor in order
to ensure their survival in an anarchic international
system (Mearsheimer 2010, 80). In this system there
is a “perpetual security competition,” which exists
in part because states are not fully sure about the
intentions of other states (Mearsheimer 2010, 81).
Adherents to a balance of power view of the world
focus most on the “physical” power capabilities of
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there were fewer dismissive or negative
articles within the Chinese media and
government statements on India. (Saalman 2011a, 90)

gic community, Indian foreign policy towards China
has focused on engagement, lowering tensions, and
building “a win-win transactional relationship that
underscores cooperation and downplays competition” (Sahgal 2012, 286). Although many prominent
figures in Indian strategic circles view the military
rise of China as a threat, there is a desire to find ways
to cooperate with China and reduce mutual threat
perceptions while maintaining Indian strategic autonomy.

Another important feature of the articles is their
length. Chinese analysts have written many long articles on Indian military modernization since 2000,
with peaks in 2005 and 2009 (Saalman 2011a, fig. 2).
These longer articles allow for more in-depth analysis, indicating that Chinese analysts are taking the Indian modernization more seriously. Great attention
has been paid to India’s military development, but
Chinese analysts have not yet designated India as a
major threat. Instead, India is regarded as an ambitious strategic rival, a state that is capable of much
but does not yet strike fear in the hearts of Chinese
defense planners and therefore does not need to be
balanced against at the moment.

The Indian and Chinese political leaderships realize that cooperation in multilateral institutions and
person-to-person contacts can be excellent ways of
opening up lines of communication, reducing threat
perceptions, and making conflict less likely. In 2006,
the Chinese invited India to become a member of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which “seeks to promote regional economic and security cooperation in Central Asia (Malik 2011, 306).
The Indian government initially refused China’s offer, but in June 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh attended an SCO summit. The Indian government began reconsidering full membership in the
SCO to move closer to regional powers after the
Obama administration began tilting more towards
Pakistan to help with the war in Afghanistan (Malik
2011, 308). The SCO provides India and China with
a place to enter into strategic dialogue and address
security concerns (Sahgal 2012, 304).

The Indian strategic community is more wary of
China’s military modernization and strategic goals.
After the Sino-Indian War, China became India’s
primary security threat, which caused the Indian
government and military to begin balancing against
China. For example, the Indian nuclear weapons
program started after the Chinese successfully tested
a nuclear device in 1964 (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010,
98). However, China ceased to be the primary threat
to India’s security in 1965, when Pakistan fought its
second war with India. For most of the twentieth
century, India’s military capabilities and doctrinal
thinking has been focused on the threat emanating
from Pakistan (Sahgal 2012, 284). This view of Pakistan as India’s primary threat has begun to change.
Reports and directives written by Indian strategic
planners in the last five years have paid more attention to China’s military modernization and strategic
goals. The defense minister’s 2010 operational directive,

Small improvements to diplomatic relations have
been made via high-level visits and simple displays
of goodwill. For example, in 2009, the Indian and
Chinese premiers established a hotline between
them to deal with political crises before they escalated out of control (Joshi 2011a, 572). In April 2013,
small incursions by Chinese military forces across
the Indian border near Ladakh caused tensions to
rise, but both governments quickly downplayed allegations that these incursions marked a significant
deterioration of relations (Guha and Spegele 2013).
It is not clear whether or not the 2009 hotline was
used during the April 2013 incidents, but the fact
that both the Indian and Chinese governments were
quick to downplay the incidents shows a desire for
stability in bilateral relations and a willingness to rapidly bring potential political disputes under control
before a situation can escalate.

asks the Indian military to prepare for
a full-spectrum war [with China] that
could include WMDs. (Sahgal 2012, 284)
Some Indian strategists believe that competition
between India and China is a zero-sum game. This
makes Chinese hegemony in Asia unacceptable, as
it would prevent India from achieving great power
status (Wang 2011, 460). Despite the characterization of China as a major threat by the Indian stratePublished by KnightScholar, 2014
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The types of military capabilities being purchased
and developed by India and China reveal their primary strategic goals and offer insight into the question of an arms race. The Indian military is focused
on building capabilities that would allow it to project
power throughout the Indian Ocean region (Saalman 2011a, 99–100). This has placed the focus of
military modernization on acquiring modern ships
and aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s military has been
developing technology for an A2/AD strategy. China’s massive arsenal of non-nuclear ballistic missiles,
which includes new anti-ship ballistic missiles like
the DF-21, would be able to destroy large surface
ships like aircraft carriers (Erickson 2010). Instead
of preparing its military to fight a war against India,
China’s military is being built up to counter American intervention in the East and South China Seas
(McVadon 2006, 96). Both India and China have
been developing very similar weapons technology
as part of their military modernization process, but
neither state is attempting to specifically counter the
capabilities of the other.

and joint exercises between militaries, as well as ensuring open lines of communication during potential crises will go a long way in clarifying each state’s
strategic goals and will make the chance of war less
likely. Both states should also be encouraged to take
active roles in peacekeeping missions, disaster relief,
and counter-terrorism/anti-piracy missions that are
organized by multilateral organizations like the UN.
If India and China can use their military power in
these issue areas, they would be helping other states
as well as themselves and would create a positive
model for developing states to follow. Rivalry between rising great powers cannot be eliminated, but
if China and India make the effort to cooperate and
reduce their threat to one another, then a hopeful
model of great power ascension can be created.
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